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Abstract
Context: Demonstrating high reliability and safety for safety-critical systems (SCSs) remains a hard problem. Diverse evidence
needs to be combined in a rigorous way: in particular, results of operational testing with other evidence from design and verification.
Growing use of machine learning in SCSs, by precluding most established methods for gaining assurance, makes evidence from
operational testing even more important for supporting safety and reliability claims.
Objective: We revisit the problem of using operational testing to demonstrate high reliability. We use Autonomous Vehicles (AVs)
as a current example. AVs are making their debut on public roads: methods for assessing whether an AV is safe enough are urgently
needed. We demonstrate how to answer 5 questions that would arise in assessing an AV type, starting with those proposed by a
highly-cited study.
Method: We apply new theorems extending our Conservative Bayesian Inference (CBI) approach, which exploit the rigour of
Bayesian methods while reducing the risk of involuntary misuse associated (we argue) with now-common applications of Bayesian
inference; we define additional conditions needed for applying these methods to AVs.
Results: Prior knowledge can bring substantial advantages if the AV design allows strong expectations of safety before road testing.
We also show how naive attempts at conservative assessment may lead to over-optimism instead; why extrapolating the trend of
disengagements (take-overs by human drivers) is not suitable for safety claims; use of knowledge that an AV has moved to a “less
stressful” environment.
Conclusion: While some reliability targets will remain too high to be practically verifiable, our CBI approach removes a major
source of doubt: it allows use of prior knowledge without inducing dangerously optimistic biases. For certain ranges of required
reliability and prior beliefs, CBI thus supports feasible, sound arguments. Useful conservative claims can be derived from limited
prior knowledge.
Keywords: Autonomous systems, safety assurance, statistical testing, safety-critical systems, ultra-high reliability, conservative
Bayesian inference, AI safety, proven in use, globally at least equivalent, software reliability growth models.
1. Introduction
Safety-Critical Systems (SCSs) play an important role in
modern societies, with increasing numbers of applications in
many domains like transportation, nuclear energy and health-
care. How to assess SCSs that require very high reliability re-
mains a challenging task after almost 30 years since the first
publications [1, 2] to highlight the problem. The main con-
clusions of [1] include: the reliability required from some sys-
tems is so high that gaining sufficient confidence in it from
their failure-free operational test alone would require infeasi-
ble amounts of testing. These authors dubbed such require-
ments “ultra-high reliability”. Combining operational testing
evidence with evidence from other forms of verification may
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raise the level of reliability that can be validated. But how to
combine them, in practice, in a statistically principled way, to
support high reliability claims remains an open question.
In this paper, using Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) as our ex-
ample, we revisit the problem of assessing SCSs with high re-
liability requirements. We also highlight some new challenges
introduced by the use of Machine Learning (ML) in SCSs, and
propose a new statistical inference method to address some ma-
jor difficulties.
Safety for conventional SCSs is guided by well-established
industry standards, prescribed development processes, and ver-
ification techniques/tools that aid engineers build evidence as
to whether a system is safe enough. However, the use of ML
in safety critical applications calls for these to be revised [3–5],
to better reflect how ML approaches can make it even harder
(compared to non-ML based systems) to estimate the probabili-
ties of failures or accidents. An increased reliance on empirical
demonstrations of safety and reliability via simulated (to the ex-
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tent that such simulations can be trusted) and operational testing
seems inevitable.
Indeed, AV manufacturers have been testing their AVs on
public roads in the U.S. for years: e.g., more than 20 million
autonomous miles have been driven (and more than 10 billion
autonomous miles simulated) by Waymo at the time of writing.
Moreover, the amount of miles driven per year is increasing.
Such operational testing in real traffic, with close observation
of AV performance, has been important testimonial evidence
in the U.S. Congress hearings on AV regulation [6]. Mean-
while, various authors [7, 8] have used the same kind of statis-
tical data to draw sobering conclusions about how far AVs are
from achieving their safety goals and (an even harder challenge
[1, 2]) demonstrating that these goals have been achieved before
a vehicle type is accepted for routine autonomous operation.
These studies mostly rely on descriptive statistics, giving
insights on various aspects of AV safety [7, 9–11]. A RAND
Corporation study [8] has been widely cited, and in this pa-
per we refer to it for comparison, to illustrate similarities and
differences between alternative statistical approaches to assess-
ment and the results thereof. For the reader’s convenience, we
will refer to that paper as “the RAND study”. The RAND study
uses classical statistical inference to find how many miles need
to be driven to claim a desired AV reliability with a certain con-
fidence level. However, such techniques do not address how
safety and reliability claims1, based on operational testing evi-
dence, can be made in a way that:
a) is practical given very rare failure events, such as fatal-
ities and crashes. If and when AVs achieve their likely safety
targets, rates of such events will be very small, say a 10−10 prob-
ability of a fatality event per mile (pfm). Gaining confidence in
such low failure rates is challenging [1, 2], possibly requiring
infeasible amounts of failure-free operation to discriminate be-
tween the conjectures that the pfm, for instance, is as low as
desired or not. If some accidents do occur, as is the case, the
original challenges found in [1, 2] become even harder. This
was the case in the RAND study findings.
b) incorporates relevant prior knowledge. In conventional
systems, such prior knowledge would typically include evidence
of soundness of design (as supported by verification results) and
quality of process. AVs rely on ML software for core function-
ality, and the ability to prove correct design is lacking (despite
intense research). But AVs, just as more conventional systems,
will normally include safety precautions: e.g., defence-in-depth
design with safety monitors/watchdogs. Indeed, such “safety
subsystems” are not only recommended in policy documents
[12, 13], but also extensively implemented by AV manufactur-
ers [14, 15]. These subsystems have relatively simple func-
tionality (e.g., bringing the vehicle to a safe stop) and could
possibly avoid relying on ML functions, thus allowing conven-
tional verification methods. If such subsystems form the basis
1In this paper we only deal with probabilistic claims, so “reliability” claims
will be about probabilities of occurrence of failures, “safety” claims about fail-
ures that are safety-relevant. The two kinds do not require different statistical
reasoning, except as far as affected by practical differences in e.g., frequencies,
desired bounds, and degrees of observability.
for prior confidence in safety, evidence about their development
and verification should be combined (in a statistically princi-
pled way) with operational testing evidence. The same applies
if safety evidence for the ML functions (e.g., from automated
testing and formal verification of Neural Networks [16, 17]) and
for the whole system (e.g., with a more direct matching between
architecture, verification methods and arguments) [3, 18–20]) is
available.
c) considers that while road testing data is collected, the
AVs undergo updating and are deployed in different environ-
ments. For an unchanging vehicle that operates under statisti-
cally unchanging conditions, “constant event rate” models, as
applied, e.g., in the RAND study, may apply. However, there is
an expectation that AV safety improves as the AV evolves (i.e.
its ML-based core systems “learn”) with driving experience, or
that the AV is deployed in different environments with different
road/traffic conditions, and both kinds of change will affect the
frequency of failures.
The present paper is an extension of our conference paper
[21], with new content listed as the last 3 contributions in the
following list. The key contributions of this work are:
1) For constant failure rate scenarios, we develop a new
Conservative Bayesian Inference (CBI) method for reliability
assessment, that can incorporate both failure-free and “rare fail-
ures” evidence. For AVs, occasional failures are to be expected.
Including operational evidence with “rare failures” into the as-
sessment generalises existing CBI methods (applied in other
settings such as nuclear safety) that, so far, consider only failure-
free evidence [22–26]. Being a Bayesian approach, CBI allows
for the incorporation of prior knowledge of non-road-testing ev-
idence (e.g., verified aspects of the behaviour of an AV’s ML
algorithms; verification results for the safety subsystems). We
then compare claims based on our CBI framework with claims
from other AV studies, using the same data and settings (in par-
ticular, we consider how CBI compares with the well-known
inference approach used in the RAND study). CBI shows how
these other approaches can be either optimistic, or too pes-
simistic, and the difference may be substantial.
2) For assessing changes in failure rate, we extend CBI to
statistical inference using bivariate prior distributions, so that
partial prior knowledge on the relationship between the (un-
known) failure rates before and after the changes can be used to
answer practical questions regarding the deployment of a new
version of an AV, or deployment of the same AV in a new envi-
ronment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
formalise such questions about AVs using a statistical model.
3) In practice, assessors may be interested in different relia-
bility measures, e.g., expected failure rate or confidence bounds
on a required failure rate. The meaning of “being conservative”
varies as the reliability measure under study changes. By way
of numerical examples, we exemplify errors that can occur if
the relationship between reliability measures and conservatism
is misunderstood.
4) In the original conference paper [21], we showed how
past AV disengagement2 data can be used by Software Reliabil-
2Events in which AVs’ control is switched to human drivers, e.g. due to
2
ity Growth Models (SRGMs) [27] to predict future disengage-
ment per mile (dpm), and emphasised that using SRGMs to pre-
dict dpm is a valuable tool for planning (but not safety assess-
ment). The present paper provides more complete arguments:
against basing safety decisions directly on statistical extrapo-
lations (e.g., via SRGMs) of the trend of dpm; and about how
SRGM-based arguments could be made relevant.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section
2, we present preliminaries on assessing reliability from opera-
tional testing. Section 3 and 4 then detail the new CBI methods
for scenarios of constant, and then of changing, failure rate.
Sections 5 and 6 discuss (and illustrate) risks with uninformed
attempts at conservative assessments, and with using extrapola-
tions of disengagement trends dpm prediction for safety claims.
Finally, sections 7 and 8 summarise related work, contributions
and future work.
2. Operational testing & failure processes
For conventional SCSs, statistical evaluation from opera-
tional testing, or “proven in use” arguments, are part of stan-
dards like IEC61508 [28] and EN50129 [29]. These practices
are supported by probabilistic methods, both established [30–
32] and still evolving [33–35]. Since, for AVs, road testing is
emphasised as evidence for building public confidence in safety
and reliability, inference methods using such operational evi-
dence should indeed attract attention.
In general, depending on the system under study, a stochas-
tic failure process is chosen as a mathematical abstraction of
reality. Here, for AVs, we describe the failure processes – for
the occurrence of fatalities or crashes – as Bernoulli processes.
These models assume the probability of a failure3 per driven
mile is a constant, and events in one mile are independent of
events in any other mile driven. This process assumption may
not really hold for various reasons that depend on the contexts.
But in many practical scenarios a Bernoulli model is an accept-
able approximation of the more complex, real process.
a) For constant failure rate scenarios, we assume a “finalised”
version of the AV deployed in unchanging environmental con-
ditions. In practice, AVs are typically updated while road test-
ing progresses. A possible argument for still using a constant
failure rate model as a first approximation could be, for in-
stance, that the non-ML based safety subsystems makes the
failure rate for the overall AV much smaller than that of the ML-
based systems alone, and this overall AV reliability remains
constant during observation, despite the online evolution of the
ML-based systems, or the small changes of road conditions
from a safety perspective4. Thus, there are two reasons for us to
failures.
3For brevity, we call “failure” generically the event of interest (fatality,
crash, etc.), and use “failure rate” both in its technical meaning as the parameter
(dpm) of, say, a Poisson process, and for the probability of failure per mile in a
Bernoulli model (e.g., for pfm).
4“A first approximation” because the evolution of the ML-based core
changes the set of failures to be tolerated by the safety subsystem (cf. [36]).
A previous statistical study [37] found that some key AV reliability measures,
e.g. the accident rate for AVs, appear constant over time. But this is not enough
to support making it a modelling assumption.
use this model: i) the model is simple enough to highlight the
challenges of AV safety assessment, and ii) for the purpose of
comparison against the RAND study [8] which uses this model.
b) On the other hand, we also consider scenarios with a
change of failure rate, in which we assume there is a signifi-
cant version update of the AV (e.g., a new software architecture
or a thoroughly retrained ML component) or a non-negligible
change of environmental conditions (e.g., moving to operation
in another country). Then, the probabilities of the failures that
a safety subsystem will mitigate, and those that it cannot mit-
igate, will change. This, in turn, could have a notable effect
on the safety of the AV. In this case, we still assume the failure
processes of the AV before and after the changes as Bernoulli
models, for the reasons discussed above, while the statistical
inference is done on a bi-variate probability distribution of the
unknown failure rates.
3. The CBI as a constant event-rate model
Assessment claims using statistical inference come in dif-
ferent flavours. The RAND study derives “classical” confi-
dence statements about the claim of an acceptable failure rate.
For instance, 95% confidence in a bound of 10−x means that if
the failure rate were greater than 10−x, the chances of observ-
ing no failures in the miles driven would be 5% at most. This
quantifies the extent to which the empirical test (of that many
miles of road testing) challenges an unreliable system, and is
often used for deciding whether to accept the system for oper-
ation. The Bayesian approach, instead, treats failure rate as a
random variable with a “prior” probability distribution (“prior”
to test observations). The prior is updated (via Bayes’ theorem)
using test results, giving a “posterior” distribution. Decisions
are based on probabilities derived from the posterior distribu-
tion, e.g., the probability (“Bayesian confidence”), say 0.95, of
the failure rate being less than 10−x. These two notions of con-
fidence have radically different meanings, but decision mak-
ing based on levels of “confidence” of either kind is common:
hence we will compare the amounts and kinds of evidence re-
quired to achieve high “confidence” with either approach.
Now, a challenge for using Bayesian inference in practice is
the need for complete prior distributions (of the failure rate, in
the present problem). A common way to deal with this issue is
to choose distribution functions that seem plausible in the do-
main and/or mathematically convenient (e.g. for conjugacy).
However, forcing oneself to state such a complete distribution
may well mean that the distribution itself does not describe only
one’s prior knowledge, but adds extra, unjustified assumptions.
This may do no harm if the posterior depends on the data much
more than on the prior distribution, but in our case (with pos-
sibly zero failures), the conclusions of the inference will be se-
riously sensitive to these assumptions: those extra assumptions
risk dangerously unsound reasoning.
CBI bypasses this problem: rather than a complete prior
distribution, an assessor is more likely to have (and be able to
justify) more limited partial prior knowledge, e.g. a prior con-
fidence bound – “I am 80% confident that the failure rate is
smaller than 10−3” – based on e.g. experience with results of
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similar quality practices in similar projects. This partial prior
knowledge is far from a complete prior distribution. Rather, it
constrains the prior: there is an infinite set of prior distributions
satisfying the constraints. Then, depending on the specific reli-
ability measure of interest (e.g., posterior expected failure rate
or a posterior confidence bound on a required failure rate – the
example we focus on in this paper), CBI seeks a prior distribu-
tion, within the set of all prior distributions satisfying the partial
prior knowledge, that gives the most conservative result for the
posterior prediction.
The essential idea of CBI is applicable in a variety of con-
texts and scenarios [22–26]. It has been investigated for various
objective functions (the posterior measures of interest) with dif-
ferent forms of constraints (the partial prior knowledge), e.g., a
posterior expected failure rate given a prior confidence bound
in [22]. However, all published CBI methods are for conven-
tional SCSs (e.g., nuclear protection systems, where any fail-
ure is assumed to have significant consequences), and thus deal
with operational testing where no failures occur. AI systems do
fail in operation. For AVs, crashes and fatalities, although rare,
have been reported. To deal with (infrequent) failures, we pro-
pose a more general CBI method, in which 0 failures becomes
a special case. This is reflected by a more general form of the
likelihood function in the Bayesian inference.
For AVs, here we apply CBI to assessing pfm and proba-
bility of seeing crash-events per mile (pcm). To compare the
results with those of the RAND study, the new CBI theorems
we present use as objective function the probability of the pfm
(or pcm) being smaller than a required bound after seeing road
testing evidence.
3.1. CBI with failures in testing
As described in Section 2, consider a Bernoulli process rep-
resenting a succession of miles driven by an AV, and let X be the
unknown pfm value (the setup if one considers crashes instead
of fatalities is analogous). Suppose k failures in n driven miles
are observed (denoted as k&n in the equations, for brevity). If
F(x) is a prior distribution function for X then, for some stated
reliability bound p,
Pr(X 6 p | k&n) =
∫ p
0 x
k(1 − x)n−kdF(x)∫ 1
0 x
k(1 − x)n−kdF(x)
(1)
As an example, suppose that, rather than some complete
prior distribution, only partial prior beliefs are expressed about
an AV’s pfm:
Pr(X 6 ) = θ, Pr(X > pl) = 1 (2)
The interpretations of the model parameters are:
•  is the engineering goal: a target level that developers
try to achieve for a reliability or safety measure (e.g. pfm). To
illustrate, for pfm, this goal could be two [38], or three [15],
orders of magnitude safer than the average for human drivers.
• θ is the prior confidence (before testing the AV on pub-
lic roads) that the engineering goal has been achieved. Such
prior confidence would have to be high enough to decide to
proceed to testing on public roads. It could be obtained from
simulations, verification of the AV safety subsystems, etc. For
instance, high quality development and verification of correct-
ness against rigorously verified requirements would give some
confidence that these subsystems are fault-free, or “perfect” or
approximately so (as discussed more in depth elsewhere, e.g.,
[23, 24, 39]). An initial value θ for this confidence would derive
from historical evidence (essentially: what fraction of similar
systems, similarly proved to be free of safety faults, were actu-
ally so, as far as is known after extensive operation?), tempered
with some prudence about the validity of the data. Failure free
simulated operation would strengthen this confidence [24].
• pl is a lower bound on the failure rate: the best reliability
claim feasible given current vehicle technology. For instance,
pfm cannot be smaller than, say 10−15, due e.g. to the possi-
bility of catastrophic hardware failures (tyre/engine fails on a
highway), even if the AV’s control and safety systems, includ-
ing the ML parts, were perfect. pl would be estimated from
historical statistics of such accidents.
We note that  > pl because even extensive historical evi-
dence of efficacy of verification could not discriminate between
systems that are indeed free of design faults and systems where
design faults only exist that cause very low failure rates [23, 25].
We have outlined how the values of parameters in (2) could
be chosen in practice to demonstrate that (2) is a plausible form
for prior beliefs that can be supported with reasonable argu-
ments. Other forms may be found, with different parameters,
depending on the evidence available; or other interpretations
could be applied to the parameters in (2), varying between man-
ufacturers and across business models.
Now, assuming one has the prior beliefs (2), the following
CBI theorem shows what these beliefs allow one to rigorously
claim about an AV’s safety and reliability.
Theorem 1. A prior distribution that gives the infimum for
(1), subject to the constraints (2), is the two-point distribution
Pr(X = x) = θ1x=x1 + (1−θ)1x=x3 , where pl 6 x1 6  < x3 and
the values of x1, x3 both depend on the model parameters (i.e.
pl, , p) as well as k and n. Using this prior, the infimum for (1)
is
xk1(1 − x1)n−kθ
xk1(1 − x1)n−kθ + xk3(1 − x3)n−k(1 − θ)
1p> (3)
where 1S is an indicator function – it is equal to 1 when S is
true and 0 otherwise.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. Depicted in
Fig. 1 are two common situations (given different values of the
model parameters): with failure-free and “rare failures” evi-
dence.
Solving (3) for n – the miles to be driven to claim the pfm
is less than p with probability c, after seeing k failures – pro-
vides our main technical result. From a Bayesian perspective,
n will depend on the prior knowledge (2). In what follows, we
compare the proposed n values from CBI, the RAND study, a
Uniform prior and Jeffreys prior (as suggested by regulatory
guidance like [30]). Similar comparisons can be made for pcm;
we omit these due to page limitations.
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Figure 1: Conservative two-point priors for two choices of model pa-
rameters – with failure free data (left) and rare failures (right).
3.2. Numerical examples of CBI for pfm claims
In the RAND study, data from the U.S. department of trans-
portation supported a pfm for human drivers of 1.09e−8 in 2013.
For illustration, suppose that a company aims to build AVs two
orders of magnitude safer, i.e.  = 1.09e−10, as proposed by
[38]. Also, assume pl = 10−15: that is, the unknown pfm value
cannot be better than 10−15.
Q1: How many fatality-free miles need to be driven to
claim a pfm bound at some confidence level?
With the prior knowledge (2), we answer Q1 by setting
k = 0 and solving (3) for n. Fig. 2 shows the CBI results
with θ = 0.1 (weak belief) and θ = 0.9 (strong belief) respec-
tively, compared with the RAND results, and Bayesian results
with a uniform prior Beta(1, 1) and the Jeffreys prior for Bi-
nomial models (Beta(0.5, 0.5) [30, p.6.37]). Fig. 2 shows that
Figure 2: Fatality-free miles needed to be driven to demonstrate a pfm
claim with 95% confidence. Note: the curves for Bayes with a uniform
prior and the RAND results overlap; to be precise, there is a constant
difference of 1 between them, which is simply a consequence of the
similarity between their analytical expressions in this scenario).
(3) can imply significantly more, or less, miles must be driven
than suggested by either the RAND study or the other Bayesian
priors – depending on how confident one is before seeing test
results that the goal  has been reached. For instance, to claim,
with 95% confidence, that AVs are as safe as human drivers
(so p = 1.09e−8), the RAND analysis requires 275 million
fatality-free miles, whilst CBI with θ = 0.9 only requires 69
million fatality-free miles, with 90% prior confidence that the
AVs are two orders of magnitude safer than humans (based on,
e.g., having the core ML-based systems backed up by non-ML
safety channels that are relatively simple and easier to be veri-
fied. Such verification can be the case in traditional SCSs [40]).
Alternatively, if one has only a “weak” prior belief in the
engineering goal being met (θ = 0.1), then CBI requires 476
million fatality-free miles – significantly more than the other
approaches compared.
The reader should not be surprised that our conservative ap-
proach does not always prescribe more fatality-free miles be
driven than that prescribed by the RAND study – different de-
cision criteria and statistical inference methods can yield differ-
ent results from the same data [41]. However, it is true that, for
any confidence c, CBI will require significantly more miles than
the RAND study prescriptions for all claims p “close enough”
to the engineering goal .
We note that, for AVs that may have less stringent relia-
bility requirements (e.g. AVs for industrial/agricultural use in
restricted environments), both the engineering goal and relia-
bility claims can be much less stringent (i.e., higher) than the
examples in Fig. 2. For such a scenario, Fig. 3 shows our CBI
results alongside those from the RAND study’s approach, given
an engineering goal  = 10−4 and a range [10−4, 10−2] for the
claimed bound p. Although it shows the same pattern as Fig. 2,
the evidence required to demonstrate a reliability claim being
met with the given confidence level is much less and within
a feasible range. For instance, when the claim of interest is
p = 10−3, CBI with a strong prior belief in the engineering goal
being met (i.e. θ = 0.9) requires less than 103 failure-free miles,
while the RAND method requires 2 to 3 times as many.
Figure 3: Failure-free miles needed to be driven to demonstrate a less
stringent reliability claim with 95% confidence.
Notice that, for all of the scenarios we have presented so far,
no amount of testing will support trust in any bound p lower
than . This is because of constraint (2). It allows a range
of possible prior distributions – and thus posterior confidence
bounds – but, as our theorems show, it gives no basis for trusting
any bound better than  (as exemplified in Fig. 2). Hence, a
conservative decision maker that has partial prior knowledge (2)
cannot accept a claim, on the basis of the fatality-free operation,
that the AV reliability exceeds the engineering goal.
This consistency with the limited beliefs that one can con-
fidently bring to the inference is the strength of CBI. We based
the CBI example in this paper on the form of beliefs (2), which
we think can be reasonably argued in practice (not necessarily
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for the -level in Fig. 2); but if further evidence justified a prior
belief in some bound p (< ), this further constraint on the set of
possible priors would cause CBI to give less pessimistic claims.
Q2: How many miles need to be driven, with fatality
events, to claim a pfm bound at some confidence level?
The RAND study answers this question via classical hy-
pothesis testing, choosing as an example a confidence bound
20% better than human drivers’ pfm in 2013. Their result (in
number of miles required) is shown in boldface in Table. 1.
In the Bayesian approach, posterior confidence depends on
observations. In order to compare with the RAND study re-
sult, we thus postulate an observed number of fatalities consis-
tent with the RAND study analysis. As an example, we con-
sider that, given a pfm equal to the above confidence bound,
and driving the number of miles found necessary in the RAND
study, the expected number of fatalities would be k = 8.72e−9×
4.97e9 ≈ 43 (where 8.72e−9 is a reliability claim obtained from
4.97e9 fatality free miles in the RAND model). We thus assume
43 fatalities and show in column 1 of Table 1 the miles required
by the Bayesian approaches, including CBI, Uniform and Jef-
freys priors. In addition to the purpose of comparison, this case
also represents a long term scenario in which, as popularity and
public use of AVs grow, the count of fatal accidents progres-
sively reaches high values. We show what evidence would then
be needed to reassure the public that reliability claims are still
being met.
For a short term scenario, as a second example, the last col-
umn of Table 1 shows the corresponding results, if only one
fatality occurs. Again, we compare the results of classical hy-
pothesis testing, CBI and using other Bayesian priors.
All of the examples in Table 1 “agree”: the miles needed
to make these claims are prohibitively high. However, given
the prior beliefs we assume for CBI, the CBI numbers require
10∼20 times more miles than the rest if 43 fatalities are seen.
The number at the bottom of column 1 represents the miles
needed to demonstrate that, after fatalities consistent with pfm=
8.72e−9, there is only a 5% chance of the true pfm being worse
than that. The difference from the RAND results may seem
large, but it is in the interest of public safety: CBI avoids any
implicit, unwittingly optimistic assumptions in the prior distri-
bution. We recall that with no fatalities, the CBI example does
offer a sound basis for achieving high confidence with substan-
tially fewer test miles than the RAND approach requires (e.g.
69 vs 275 million miles).
p=8.72e-9, k=43 p=4.12e-9, k=1
Classical 4.97e9 2.43e8
Uniform priors 6.40e9 1.15e9
Jeffreys priors 6.33e9 9.48e8
CBI with θ = 0.9 7.89e10 3.88e9
Table 1: Miles needed to support a pfm claim p with 95% confidence,
with k fatalities.
Q3: How many more fatality-free miles need to be driven
to compensate for one newly observed fatality?
This question relates to the following plausible scenario. An
AV has been driven for n1 fatality-free miles, justifying a pfm
claim, say p (with a fixed confidence c), via CBI based on this
evidence and some given prior knowledge. Then suddenly a
fatality event happens. Instead of redesigning the system (as no
evidence exists to point to a technical/AI control design fault),
the company still believes in its prior knowledge, attributes the
fatality to “bad luck”, and asks to be allowed more testing to
prove its point. If the public/regulators accept this request, it is
useful to know how many extra fatality-free miles, say n2, are
needed to compensate for the fatality event, so that the company
can demonstrate the same reliability p with confidence c.
To answer this, apply the CBI model in two steps (fixing
the confidence level c and prior knowledge θ): (i) determine the
claim [X 6 p ] that n1 will support with k = 0 (i.e. fix k, n &
solve (3) for p). (ii) determine the miles that support the claim
[X6 p ] upon seeing k=1 (i.e. fix k, p & solve (3) for n). Then
n2 = n − n1 more fatality-free miles are needed to compensate
for the fatality; we plot some scenarios in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Fatality-free miles needed to compensate one newly ob-
served fatality given n1 fatality-free miles has been driven before.
The solid curve in Fig. 4 shows a uni-modal pattern, de-
creasing as n1 approaches the value n∗ = 1.06e11 (with a cor-
responding p value, p∗ = 1.16e−10, derived from the 1st step),
then increasing again with an asymptote of n2 = 1/, as n1
goes to infinity. A complete formal analysis deriving p∗ and the
asymptote of n2 = 1/ is in Appendix B.
Intuitively, the more fatality-free miles were driven, the higher
one’s confidence in reliability; and thus, the more miles needed
to restore that confidence after a fatality occurs. But, if n1 was
so high as to allow confidence in a claim close to p∗, then after
the fatality, a much smaller n2 is needed to be able to claim p∗
again. As n1 tends to infinity, interestingly, there is a ceiling on
the required n2, for all values of c and θ. We note that the shape
of the curve (including the asymptote on the right) is invariant
with respect to c and θ.
4. CBI for changing event rate
In the previous section, we assumed an unchanging vehicle
(in terms of pfm) operating under environments that have un-
changing statistical properties, and thus a “constant event rate”
CBI model. In this section, we consider scenarios in which
the event rate of interest could change between the “testing”
regime and the regime for which a prediction is sought. For
instance, one might reasonably expect changes in event rates
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if future use of the AV is in different climates or regions from
the testing (because these could imply different frequencies of
weather conditions – like thunder storms vs sunny spells – or
of road works, or heavy and light traffic conditions), or differ-
ent seasons (e.g, testing in summer for predicting rates in the
following winter). The analyses presented in this section are
a starting point for conservative assessment under such situa-
tions. By way of example, we will refer to the following two
scenarios in the discussion that follows:
• Q4: the AV has been tested on the roads in City-A for
nA fatality-free miles. Now the company wants to de-
ploy the AV to City-B. We have high confidence (say
φ) that the road conditions of the two cities are similar
and the change of environments should not harm safety.
However, to be conservative, how many new fatality-free
miles need to be driven in City-B (denoted as nB) to claim
a required pfm bound for City-B, say pB, with a given
confidence level c?
• Q5: Version-A of the AV has been tested extensively, say
for nA fatality-free miles, on public roads. Now we have
updated the AV to a new Version-B. We have high con-
fidence (say φ) that the pfm of Version-B should be no
worse than that of Version-A. However, to be conserva-
tive, how many extra fatality-free miles need to be driven
for the Version-B (denoted as nB) to claim a required pfm
bound, say pB, with a given confidence level c?
To answer the questions in the above scenarios, we develop
a new CBI model with two variables, X and Y , representing re-
spectively the unknown pfm values of the two cities/versions –
pfmA and pfmB. Thus, instead of a one-dimensional prior distri-
bution F(x) as in Eq. (1), there is now a two-dimensional joint
prior distribution FAB(x, y). Then, for some required bound pB,
our objective function – the posterior confidence in the bound
after seeing nA and nB fatality-free miles of the two cities/versions
is:
Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB) =
∫ pB
0
∫ 1
0 (1 − x)nA (1 − y)nBdFAB(x, y)∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 (1 − x)nA (1 − y)nBdFAB(x, y)
(4)
The CBI philosophy is even more appropriate in this case:
it is even harder for assessors to have a complete bivariate prior
distribution; rather, they will have some limited partial knowl-
edge about it. To deal with the Q4 and Q5 scenarios, we con-
sider a joint prior distribution FAB(x, y) defined over the unit-
square in Fig. 5, where 7 regions of interest appear (each regioni
to be associated with a probability mass Mi) and:
• for City-A/Version-A, we have, as in our previous sce-
nario, marginal partial knowledge of pfmA as shown in
Eq. (2): a certain lower bound pl and
∑
i=1,4,5 Mi = θ.
• for the new City-B/Version-B, we have
Pr(Y 6 X) = φ, Pr(Y > pl) = 1 (5)
That is, confidence φ that the pfmB is no worse than the
pfmA (i.e.
∑
i=3,5,7 Mi = φ). Also, just as for City/Version-
A, there is a lower bound pl on pfmB.
Figure 5: The sample space on which the joint prior distribution
FAB(x, y) is defined, with 7 regions of interest. A distribution FAB(x, y)
associates a probability mass Mi to each regioni.
Theorem 2. A prior distribution that gives the infimum for (4),
subject to constraints (2) and (5), is a three-point distribution.
When φ > 1 − θ, as shown in Fig. 6, the prior is Pr(X = x,Y =
y) = (1 − φ)1x=pl,y=pB + (1 − θ)1x=pB,y=pB + (φ − 1 + θ)1x=,y= .
Using this prior, the infimum for (4) is
(1 − )nA+nBM5
(1−)nA+nBM5+(1−pB)nA+nBM3+(1−pl)nA (1−pB)nBM1 1φ>1−θ
(6)
where M1 = 1 − φ, M3 = 1 − θ, M5 = φ − 1 + θ and 1S is
an indicator function – it is equal to 1 when S is true and 0
otherwise. When φ 6 1 − θ, the worst-case prior distribution
will always yield 0 as the infimum for (4).
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C. Given a required
level of confidence, say c = 95%, and other model parameters
(i.e. pB, pl, , φ and θ), we solve Eq. (6) for nB, obtaining the
answer we are seeking for Q4 and Q5 (the relevant analytical
expression is Eq. (C.14) in Appendix C).
Figure 6: The worst-case 3-point joint prior distribution that gives the
infimum for Eq. (4) when φ > 1 − θ, subject to constraints (2) and (5).
Fig. 7 shows the answers to Q4 and Q5 as a function of nA,
given the same prior knowledge in Q1 (i.e. pl = 1e−15,  =
1.09e−10 and θ = 0.9) with φ prior confidence that the pfm of
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City-B/Version-B is no worse than the pfm of City-A/Version-
A. For φ = 0.8, there are 2 stages on the dotted curve – it first
decreases and then increases (nB → ∞ as nA → ∞, and the
growth of nB is O(nA), as proved in Appendix D), with a global
minimum point (cf. Eq. (C.15) in Appendix C for analytical
results):
• in the first stage, the more fatality-free miles nA are ob-
served for City-A/Version-A, the more we believe both
cities/versions are safe, thanks to the prior knowledge
about “B is no worse than A”. That is, on the prior distri-
bution in Fig. 6, increasing nA, the miles driven, gradually
depletes probability mass M3 to the benefit of masses M5
(i.e., probability of the required bound being satisfied for
B) and M1. Thus, claiming the required safety level re-
quires less fatality-free evidence to be collected for City-
B/Version-B.
• the second stage, on the other hand, represents a “too
good to be true” case. When we increase nA to a very
large value, starting from the prior distribution in Fig. 6,
both probability masses M3 and M5 gradually decrease
while M1 increases (the small prior doubt that pfmA may
be worse than pfmB becomes very large). But, the prob-
ability mass M1 is the probability of not satisfying the
required bound pB. To show that City-B/Version-B is in-
deed as safe as required (Y 6 pB with probability 95%)),
we need to drive so many miles in B that enough proba-
bility mass “flows’ back from M1 to M5.
Similarly for the dashed curve in Fig. 7 when φ = 0.99,
in addition to the two stages discussed above, there is a nB = 0
“terrace” stage between them – for this range of nA values, there
is no need to test City-B/Version-B, since the nA evidence from
City-A/Version-A, together with the φ confidence in B being
safer than A, is already enough to prove the claim for B. The
shape of the curve is the same as for φ = 0.8, but truncated
at zero in the range of nA where the required confidence in the
bound pB is exceeded, without any testing in B.
It is worth mentioning the special case in which we are cer-
tain the pfmB is no worse than pfmA (i.e. φ = 1). Then, the
result (6) becomes
(1 − )nA+nBθ
(1 − )nA+nBθ + (1 − pB)nA+nB(1 − θ) (7)
which coincides, according to Theorem 1, with the posterior
confidence on a required bound pB after seeing no fatality in
nA + nB miles (i.e. Pr(pfmB 6 pB | k = 0, n = (nA + nB))). That
is, if φ = 1, the fatality-free evidence about City-A/Version-
A can be treated as evidence about City-B/Version-B as well.
This is not the case when φ < 1. For example, to claim pfmB 6
1.09e−8 with 95% confidence: (i) if φ = 1 and nA is around
69 million miles, then we don’t need any further road testing in
City-B/Version-B; But (ii) if φ = 0.99 and nA is still 69 million
miles, then we need fatality-free miles nB, around 19 million
miles (the intersection point of the dashed curve and the vertical
line in Fig. 7), to “compensate” for that 0.01 doubt.
Now (iii) if φ = 0.8 and nA is still 69 million miles, then we
need nB to be around 170 million miles (the intersection point of
the dotted curve and the vertical line in Fig. 7). This 3rd case re-
veals an apparent paradox: to conservatively claim that the AV
is 100 times safer than humans (with 95% confidence), City-
B/Version-B needs significantly more testing (i.e. 170 million
miles) than would be needed to conservatively make the same
claim for City-A/Version-A (i.e. 69 million miles) – this, de-
spite already having driven 69million miles for City-A/Version-
A and the “seemingly favourable” confidence φ = 0.8 that City-
B/Version-B is safer. An assessor may ask: “Why then don’t I
just assess B ‘from scratch’, discarding the evidence of nA miles
driven in A, and φ?”. To this one can reply that: (a) discarding
knowledge that one has may be unwise, although comparing
the results one obtains from using this knowledge with those
obtained without it may be informative; (b) the assessment of
City-A/Version-A benefits from strong prior knowledge/beliefs
in the engineering goal (pfmA 6 ) being achieved, with θ con-
fidence. However, for City-B/Version-B, such confidence in the
engineering goal being met is replaced by the weaker – though
still helpful – premise that B enjoys greater safety than A with
probability φ.
Figure 7: Fatality-free miles that need to be driven in City-B (by
Version-B), given that nA fatality-free miles have been driven in City-
A (by Version-A) in scenarios Q4 and Q5. The straight horizontal and
vertical lines show the amount of road testing that would yield the tar-
get confidence c = 95% in the required bound pfm 6 1.09e−8 in the
single-version, single-city scenario of Q1.
5. Potential fallacies in attempts at “conservatism”
The idea that for certain safety-related decisions one would
want “conservative” assessments – to make sure to avoid er-
rors in the direction of excessive optimism even if this causes
some error in the direction of pessimism – is quite commonly
accepted. However, it is worth pointing out that how to ob-
tain “conservatism” is not intuitively obvious. The apparatus of
theorems that accompany each CBI method is thus necessary.
In particular, which detailed prior gives the most conservative
conclusion, given the prior knowledge actually available and
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the new observations, depends on the objective function that we
seek to maximise or minimise. Despite this being well known,
a likely error seems to be that of taking assumptions that are
conservative from one viewpoint (i.e. for a certain objective
function) and trusting that they ensure conservatism from every
viewpoint (see e.g. [42, Sec. 7.5]).
We illustrate here the degree of error that this misunder-
standing may cause in the scenarios considered in this paper.
For purposes of comparison with the RAND study, we have in-
troduced CBI theorems to produce worst cases for a specific
objective function: a posterior confidence in a required bound
on failure rate. One may be interested in other reliability mea-
sures. For instance, to cite some considered in previous CBI
studies, expected failure rate, or probability of suffering no fail-
ures in operation. But the means for being conservative must
vary depending on the objective function: there is no univer-
sal “worst-case prior distribution” for all objective functions of
possible interest. Thus, even if we start with the same prior
knowledge, the worst-case prior distribution may vary depend-
ing on the objective functions chosen.
Misuse of worst-case prior distributions – i.e., using the
prior that is “worst-case” for one objective function in order
to obtain a worst case for another objective function – will pro-
duce misleading results, with any errors being in the direction
of unjustified optimism. Shown below are some examples of
such misuse.
In a similar context to that of Q1 (i.e. observing n fatality-
free miles and given the partial prior knowledge of Eq. (2)),
for an objective function “posterior expected pfm”, a previously
proven CBI theorem [22] guarantees that:
E[X | n fatality-free miles] =
∫ 1
pl
x(1 − x)n dF(x)∫ 1
pl
(1 − x)n dF(x)
6 (1 − )
nθ + q(1 − q)n(1 − θ)
(1 − )nθ + (1 − q)n(1 − θ)
(8)
which implies the worst-case prior distribution is still a two-
point one: Pr(X = x) = θ1x= + (1 − θ)1x=q where the r.h.s.
point q is a function of n that can be obtained by numerical op-
timization. This worst-case prior distribution is different from
the one for Q1, in which a posterior confidence in a given con-
fidence bound is of interest – the left-hand distribution in Fig. 1
which has a fixed far-end point at x = p (where p is the re-
quired bound). If we now misuse the worst-case prior related to
the posterior expected value Eq. (8), by applying it to question
Q1 in a naive attempt at obtaining worst-case confidence in a
bound p, this will lead to optimistic results, as Fig. 8 illustrates.
Or, the other way around, Fig. 9 shows an example of using the
wrong prior to calculate the worst-case posterior expected pfm,
which also ends up being optimistic. The intersection points of
the curves in both figures represent the special case of some ob-
served n such that, on the worst-case 2-point prior distribution
yielding (8), the r.h.s. optimised point q happens to be equal to
the given p.
Figure 8: An example of using the wrong worst-case prior distribution.
Figure 9: Another example of using the wrong worst-case prior distri-
bution.
6. Potential fallacies in using disengagement data and/or
extrapolating past trends for safety assessment
For the sake of public safety, it is usually required that AVs
being tested on public roads be supervised by human drivers
(sometimes called “safety drivers”) who are responsible for mon-
itoring the safe operation of the vehicles at all times, and must
take over control (this is a “disengagement” of the autonomous
driving function) in the event of a failure of the autonomous
technology or other emergency. It is also mandated that disen-
gagements during road testing be reported, and records made
available to the public5.
As AV technology evolves, one would expect a decreasing
trend in the frequency of disengagements. Indeed, Banerjee and
co-authors, using large-scale AV road testing data, show nega-
tive correlation between dpm and cumulative miles driven over
three years, but still not reaching AV manufacturers’ targets de-
spite millions of miles driven [7]. Disengagements are much
more frequent than serious accidents. So, studying the trend of
dpm, as done in several statistical papers [7, 10, 37], is appeal-
ing.
Studying these trends is a useful tool for planning future
road testing. To this end, in our previous paper [21] we showed
5E.g., www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/testing/ (at the
time of writing).
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how past AV disengagement data can be used to predict future
disengagement via Software Reliability Growth Models (SRGMs)
[27] – a family of statistical, point-process models represent-
ing the occurrence of software failures in continuous time. Fit-
ting these models to Waymo’s publicly available disengagement
data over 51 months, we evaluated the accuracy of their relia-
bility forecasts, and showed how the models’ predictions can be
improved by “recalibration” – a model improvement technique
that utilizes statistical data on how the models’ past predictions
fall short of observed outcomes [43].
SRGMs, together with the forecast accuracy evaluation and
recalibration methods introduced by [43, 44], have been shown
to be a powerful tool for extrapolating the trend of AV disen-
gagements in [21]. However, we argued briefly in [21] that
SRGMs are not suitable for deciding whether the AV is safe
enough, even if a SRGM’s forecast accuracy and calibration
properties have been proved good for a data series. We give
here some more detailed and general arguments against using
statistical predictors of dpm as indicators of trends in safety (as
measured e.g. by pfm).
It is true that many disengagements represent safety-relevant
events – “near misses” – and studying near misses is a power-
ful aid for learning about the safety of a system: to gauge how
far from the safety target a system is that has not yet had any
accidents, and to correct flaws before they can cause accidents.
However:
a) The disengagement rate is not a safety indicator. Gener-
ally, there are two types of disengagement – passive disengage-
ment and active disengagement. Passive disengagements are
when subsystems in the AV detect a failure of the autonomous
technology, or detect a dangerous situation, and initiate the dis-
engagement. Active disengagements are when the AV does not
detect any problem, but the driver monitoring the situation ac-
tively disengages the autonomous mode [11]. In both cases,
ensuring safety relies on the human driver’s supervision ability
– the ability to react quickly and correctly. Imperfect human
supervision causes noise in the disengagement data – both false
positives and false negatives. Example false positives include
unnecessary interventions due to a lack of confidence of the hu-
man driver in the AV’s ability to negotiate some new pattern of
traffic, or due to non-hazardous “failures” like uncomfortable
riding. Example false negatives include dangerous situations
that are not recognised by either the AV or the human driver,
but bring no noticeable consequence due to “good luck”. More-
over, the human supervision ability will vary in complex ways
as the autonomy capacity evolves over time [45], which makes
it harder to filter out for safety assessment this noise in the dis-
engagement data. Thus, interpreting dpm as an indicator of AV
safety is wrong [7] and potentially dangerous, through both be-
ing misleading and creating incentives to improve dpm rather
than safety.
Proper use of disengagement data in arguing safety would
require assessing the interplay between (i) the evolution of ML
functions, (ii) that of the safety drivers’ supervision ability, and
(iii) the safety subsystems. For instance, we need to consider
that an improvement of ML-based functions most likely reduces
drivers’ ability to trigger disengagements when needed. Indeed,
it is likely to affect their situation awareness (and thus their abil-
ity to detect potentially dangerous situations) and/or their trust
in the AV (and thus their readiness to believe that their interven-
tion is needed to resolve that situation). Also, the probability of
a safety subsystem (like a human driver) taking successful ac-
tion depends on the probability distribution of the demands on it
created by the ML-based functions’ failures [36, 46, 47], which
will vary as the ML-based system evolves.
b) No guarantee of monotonicity. Some statistical proper-
ties of AVs, such as dpm, exhibit a reliability growth trend, in a
statistical sense. However, there is a general reason for not re-
lying on detected trends for safety assessment – a growth trend
does not imply that every update is an improvement; some up-
dates can reduce reliability. This is true for all systems, and
more so for AVs with their substantial ML components. Thus
any statistical predictor like SRGMs, that extrapolates such a
trend, will be untrustworthy. That is, we cannot give high con-
fidence in the one prediction that matters for current safety, i.e.
the prediction made after the latest change. That change could
have departed from the previous trend – even radically increas-
ing the failure rate – but the predictor would not “notice”, until
the next failure occurs, surprisingly early in view of that last
prediction.
To support the use of trend extrapolation techniques for safety,
a possible sufficient condition could be a sound empirical argu-
ment (yet to be invented, perhaps infeasible), that the AV is
evolving in such a way that it indeed becomes more and more
reliable (in terms of hazardous failures) with every update. This
requires more understanding of the online learning mechanism
of the ML component and how the dynamic distribution of fail-
ures created by it interacts with the safety subsystems. Perhaps
such an argument could be supported if the training process for
the ML were restricted in some appropriate way. All this re-
lates to activities that accumulate confidence in “no worse than
existing systems” arguments [48] (which we also used to an-
swer Q4 and Q5 in Section 4). For example, accelerated testing
in simulators before the release of a new version, attempts to
build libraries of regression tests, and verification on the learn-
ing with safety constraints [49].
One may wish to, instead, use an SRGM as a way of ob-
taining a prior belief to plug into a CBI argument. Indeed this
would be quite an appropriate use of extrapolation from pre-
vious trends. Care would be needed to choose SRGMs that
produce predictions in terms of failure rates, or to rigorously
translate predictions that are in terms of distribution of time-to-
failure into distributions of failure rates. Apart from this, we
see two kinds of practical difficulties that need to be overcome:
• obtaining a believable data series as input to the SRGM.
One would typically look for a prediction of the frequency
of hazardous situations due to AV behaviour. Predict-
ing an accident rate directly would seem inappropriate
anyway, and the log of accidents would be too sparse to
give a basis for the SRGM to “learn” a trend; logs of
disengagements would need to be “cleaned” from all the
spurious events (or missing events: undetected hazardous
situations) discussed in item (a) earlier on. However, tar-
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geted improvements in monitoring and log analysis could
possibly overcome these difficulties.
• our CBI arguments have used strong beliefs in some very
small upper bound on the failure rate. To use an SRGM’s
prediction as this belief, one would need the SRGM to
actually produce such an output, and to have proved well-
calibrated regarding that level of belief: e.g., for its “99%
confidence” statements to have been generally correct (or
conservative, in the sense we use here for “conservatism”:
conservative in the error they produce on posterior prob-
abilities) for a series of data points. SRGMs have been
rarely evaluated for good calibration for these high confi-
dence levels. However, this may be worth doing, includ-
ing dealing with the complexities in translating between
predictions of rates and of time to next event (only the
latter being observable).
7. Related work
CBI was initially presented for assessing the reliability of
conventional SCSs in [22]. Several extensions, e.g., [23–26],
have been developed, considering different prior knowledge and
objective functions. CBI has recently been used for estimat-
ing catastrophic failure related parameters in the runtime for-
mal verification of robots [50], and forming safety arguments
in assurance cases for deep learning [51].
Similarly to [48], we have extended CBI from previous “sin-
gle system/environment” applications to a scenario in which
multiple systems/environments need to be considered. But the
bivariate CBI theorem presented here in Section 4 is novel,
since: i) the reliability measure of interest in [48] is a poste-
rior expected failure rate, while here we consider a posterior
confidence bound; and ii) the evidence being observed in [48]
is only from the new system/environment, while in this paper
we model evidence generated from both systems/environments
(i.e. a more general form of the likelihood function).
Studies in [7, 9–11, 37] provide descriptive statistics on AV
safety and reliability. Both [8] and [52] conclude that road
testing alone is inadequate evidence of AV safety, and argue
the need for other methods to supplement testing on public
roads. We agree, and our CBI approach provides a concrete
way to incorporate such essential prior knowledge into the as-
sessment. There are preliminary Bayesian frameworks, e.g.,
[53, 54], trying to account for verification and validation activi-
ties performed prior to testing. However, they assume paramet-
ric families (e.g., Beta) for prior distributions, while our CBI
approach does not have this restriction and is thus more prac-
tical, and more trustworthy (through not demanding unrealis-
tically detailed input and guaranteeing conservatism) for deci-
sions on safety.
8. Conclusions & future work
The use of ML solutions in safety-critical applications is
on the rise. This imposes new challenges on safety and reli-
ability assessment. For ML systems, the inability to directly
verify that a design matches its requirements, by reference to
the process of deriving the former from the latter [3, 20], makes
it even harder (compared to conventional software) to estimate
the probabilities of failures [55]. Thus, we believe, increased
reliance on operational testing to study failure probabilities and
consequences is inevitable, which may form important evidence
in heterogeneous safety arguments for autonomous systems [20].
In the case of AVs, the problem is also one of demonstrat-
ing “ultra-high reliability” [1], for which it is well known that
convincing arguments based on operational testing alone are
infeasible. While Bayesian inference supports combining oper-
ational testing with other forms of evidence, this latter evidence
would need to be such as to support very strong prior beliefs.
Use of safety subsystems – not relying on the AV’s core ML-
based systems – that are verifiable with conventional methods
so as to support stronger prior beliefs (than can be had for the
ML-based primary system), would provide part of the solution.
How to support prior beliefs strong enough to give sufficient
posterior confidence in the kind of dependability levels now de-
sired for AVs requires investigation [56].
Our CBI approach removes the other major difficulty with
these problems, that of trusting more detailed prior beliefs than
the evidence typically allows one to argue. One can, thus, take
advantage of Bayesian combination of evidence while avoiding
optimistic bias (which we found in some other statistical infer-
ence models).
CBI is not limited to ultra-high reliability and certainly does
not solve all of the problems of assessing ultra-high reliability,
but it does allow one to trust the statistical inference step itself.
While it will help to detect some possible flaws in arguments
for ultra-high reliability, it will deliver enough confidence when
reliability requirements are not so extreme (cf. Fig. 3).
We demonstrate CBI on one of the most visible examples
of ML-based systems with safety assessment challenges – au-
tonomous vehicles. To recap, the main contributions of this
paper are:
a) for the assessment of constant event rates, we propose a
new variant of the CBI method as a constant event-rate model.
This approach will be most useful when there are sound bases
for prior beliefs, e.g., through safety-oriented architectures in
which the ML-based system functions are paired with non-ML
safety subsystems, where such safety subsystems are sufficient
to avoid accidents and can be rigorously verified.
Being a Bayesian approach, CBI allows one to “give credit”
for this essential evidence. It can thus contribute to overcoming
the challenges of supporting extreme reliability claims; while
its conservatism avoids the potential for dangerous errors in the
direction of optimism, inherent in common shortcuts for apply-
ing Bayes in these cases.
b) for the assessment of changing failure rates, as a first
step we invent a new bivariate-CBI model utilising prior knowl-
edge on the relationship between the unknown failure rates of
before and after the changes. This approach formalises long-
established forms of safety arguments about a new system being
e.g. “substantially equivalent” (for medical devices) or “glob-
ally at least equivalent” (in the European railway sector) to an
earlier system [48], which we also have seen being used infor-
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mally for AVs.
Using bivariate CBI, we show what various levels of con-
fidence in the relationship between the two failure rates, and
the amount of new testing evidence needed, allow one to claim
about the reliability of a new system version, or the same sys-
tem in a new environment.
c) Warnings against fallacies about “conservatism”. The
CBI approach, either used with a constant or changing event-
rate model, has the unique advantage of being conservative (that
is, of avoiding errors in the direction of optimism) in assessing
SCSs. While it is known that “being conservative” depends on
the objective function chosen, trying to achieve conservatism
without the necessary mathematical proofs is known to produce
fallacies. We discuss these possible fallacies, with illustrative
examples.
d) Warnings against using disengagement data, and/or ex-
trapolation of observed trends, for safety assessment. Disen-
gagements are the most widely reported statistical data about
AVs. There is an obvious decreasing trend of dpm as the AV
technology matures over time. Predicting this trend via sta-
tistical tools, e.g., SRGMs in [21], is feasible, and useful for
non-safety decisions. For instance, the trend of disengagement
data is used to gauge the “stability/maturity” of AVs in [7]. In
the present paper, we discuss why reliance on disengagement
data, and/or on trend extrapolation, for safety assessment may
be dangerous.
In future work, we plan to:
(i) explore practical means for quantitatively stating prior
knowledge (e.g. evidence from various system verification meth-
ods, applied to the AV system and its subsystems) for input
to our CBI method, detailing the processes that we outlined in
Section 3;
(ii) adapt CBI extensions to base decisions directly on risk
of accidents/fatality-free operation over finite periods, instead
of focusing on a specific bound on failure rate. As argued else-
where [23], this would more directly support sound decisions
about the progressive introduction of AVs;
(iii) build more detailed safety arguments for architectures
using safety subsystems, with appropriate subsystem-level ar-
guments based on the different forms of evidence available about
the various subsystems. These arguments would be more easily
adapted to evolving ML subsystems;
(iv) represent plausible forms of failure correlation (over
successive miles driven) within the statistical model in our CBI
approach. As outlined in section 2, our present CBI model as-
sumes that the fundamental AV failure process is Bernoulli –
specifically, that failures over successive miles driven are sta-
tistically independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) in their
occurrence. However, there are a number of analogous assess-
ment scenarios where such i.i.d. assumptions may only hold
very approximately, if at all [57–59]. In future work, upon ex-
plicitly incorporating failure correlation into CBI models, we
will quantify the extent to which the i.i.d. assumption may un-
dermine conservative assessments.
Focusing on the “hot” area of AVs, and the “ultra-high reli-
ability” problems that they pose, inevitably led us to highlight
remaining problems and extensive work still necessary. How-
ever, the novel CBI theorems that we have presented are gen-
erally applicable. They are a useful tool for ameliorating the
problem of assessing AVs, and for solving many current assess-
ment problems. The main contribution of CBI is to free users
of Bayesian methods from the risk of inordinately optimistic
predictions, which arise from spurious prior assumptions intro-
duced for mathematical convenience. Our numerical examples
show that this guaranteed conservatism does not necessarily
lead to excessively pessimistic predictions. Even in cases where
CBI yields disappointing conclusions – the desired claims are
not supported – CBI helps assurance: (i) it encourages clarity
about how the evidence collected translates into logical argu-
ments; (ii) it reveals gaps between the evidence brought to the
argument and the claims one wishes to support; and thus (iii)
helps to orient design and verification towards producing ap-
propriate evidence.
Appendix A. Statement and proof of CBI Theorem 1
Problem: Consider the set D of all probability distributions
defined over the unit interval, each distribution representing a
potential prior distribution of pfm values for an AV. For 0 < pl <
 6 1, we seek a prior distribution that minimises the posterior
confidence in a reliability bound p ∈ [pl, 1], given k fatalities
have occurred over n miles driven and subject to constraints on
some quantiles of the prior distribution. That is, for θ ∈ (0, 1],
we solve
minimise
D
Pr(X 6 p | k&n)
subject to Pr(X 6 ) = θ, Pr(X > pl) = 1
Solution: There is a prior in D that gives the infimum for the
posterior confidence: the 2-point distribution
Pr(X = x) = θ1x=x1 + (1 − θ)1x=x3
where pl 6 x1 6  < x3 , and the values of x1, x3 both depend
on the model parameters (i.e. pl, , p) as well as k and n. Using
this prior, the infimum for the posterior confidence is
xk1(1 − x1)n−kθ
xk1(1 − x1)n−kθ + xk3(1 − x3)n−k(1 − θ)
1p> (A.1)
where 1S is an indicator function – it is equal to 1 when S is
true and 0 otherwise.
Proof. The proof is constructive, starting with any feasible prior
distribution and progressing in 3 stages, each stage producing
priors that give progressively worse posterior confidence than
in the previous stage. In more detail, assuming  6 p (the ar-
gument for p <  is analogous):
1. First we show that, for any given feasible prior distribu-
tion in D, there is an equivalent feasible 3-point prior
distribution. “Equivalent”, in that the 3-point distribution
has the same value for the posterior confidence in p as
the given feasible prior. Consequently, we restrict the op-
timisation to the setD∗ of all such 3-point distributions;
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2. For each prior in D∗, there exists a 2-point prior distri-
bution with a smaller posterior confidence in p. Conse-
quently, we restrict the optimisation to the set D∗∗ of all
such 2-point priors;
3. A monotonicity argument determines a 2-point prior in
D∗∗ with the smallest posterior confidence in p.
Stage 1: Assuming  6 p, note that for any prior distribu-
tion F ∈ D, we may write
Pr(X 6 p | k&n) = T
T +
∫ 1
p+ x
k(1 − x)n−kdF(x)
(A.2)
where T =
∫ 
pl
xk(1−x)n−kdF(x)+∫ p
+
xk(1−x)n−kdF(x). The mean-
value-theorem for integrals ensures that three points exist, x1 ∈
[pl, ], x2 ∈ (, p] and x3 ∈ (p, 1], such that (A.2) becomes
(denote
∫ p
+
dF(x) = β):
xk1(1 − x1)n−kθ + xk2(1 − x2)n−kβ
xk1(1−x1)n−kθ+xk2(1−x2)n−kβ+xk3(1−x3)n−k(1−θ−β)
(A.3)
By establishing (A.3) we have established that, for any given
prior distribution one might start off with, there exists an equiv-
alent 3-point prior distribution. Thus, we restrict the optimisa-
tion toD∗, the set of all of these equivalent priors.
Stage 2: Next, for each prior in D∗, there is a 2-point prior
distribution that is guaranteed to give a smaller posterior confi-
dence in p. To see this for any given prior in D∗ with posterior
(A.3), treat all of the other variables as fixed (i.e. the “x”s and
θ) and consider which of the allowed values for β, given these
fixed values of the other variables, guarantees a distribution that
reduces the posterior confidence. The continuous differentia-
bility of rational functions – of which (A.3) is one – allows the
partial derivative of (A.3) w.r.t. β to show us the way to do
this. The partial derivative of (A.3) with respect to β is always
positive, irrespective of the fixed values the xis take in their re-
spective ranges. So, to minimise (A.3), we set β = 0. This gives
the attainable lower bound (A.4), attained by the 2-point prior
distribution with probability masses θ at x = x1, and 1 − θ at
x = x3. Therefore, we restrict the optimisation to D∗∗ – the set
of all such priors.
Pr(X6 p | k&n) > x
k
1(1 − x1)n−kθ
xk1(1 − x1)n−kθ+xk3(1 − x3)n−k(1 − θ)
=
1
1 +
(
xk3(1−x3)n−k
xk1(1−x1)n−k
)
1−θ
θ
(A.4)
Stage 3: To minimise (A.4) further (and, thereby, obtain
optimal priors inD∗∗), we maximise xk3(1− x3)n−k and minimise
xk1(1− x1)n−k over the allowed ranges for x1, x3. The problem is
now reduced to a simple monotonicity analysis given different
values of the other model parameters, as follows. Since xk(1 −
x)n−k is bell-shaped over [0, 1] with a maximum at x = k/n,
the following defines 2-point priors that solve the optimisation
problem (depicted in Fig A.10):
• When 0 6 k/n 6 pl:
to minimise xk1(1− x1)n−k, subject to x1 ∈ [pl, ], we
set x1 = ;
to maximise xk3(1 − x3)n−k, subject to x3 ∈ (p, 1], we
set x3 = p.
• When pl < k/n 6 , and pkl (1 − pl)n−k > k(1 − )n−k:
to minimise xk1(1− x1)n−k, subject to x1 ∈ [pl, ], we
set x1 = ;
to maximise xk3(1 − x3)n−k, subject to x3 ∈ (p, 1], we
set x3 = p.
• When pl < k/n 6 , and pkl (1 − pl)n−k < k(1 − )n−k:
to minimise xk1(1− x1)n−k, subject to x1 ∈ [pl, ], we
set x1 = pl;
to maximise xk3(1 − x3)n−k, subject to x3 ∈ (p, 1], we
set x3 = p.
• When  < k/n 6 p:
to minimise xk1(1− x1)n−k, subject to x1 ∈ [pl, ], we
set x1 = pl;
to maximise xk3(1 − x3)n−k, subject to x3 ∈ (p, 1], we
set x3 = p.
• When p < k/n 6 1:
to minimise xk1(1− x1)n−k, subject to x1 ∈ [pl, ], we
set x1 = pl;
to maximise xk3(1 − x3)n−k, subject to x3 ∈ (p, 1], we
set x3 = k/n.
The form of Pr(X < p | k&n) for each prior above is (A.1).
All of the preceding arguments guarantee that this value is the
infimum for Pr(X 6 p | k&n).
We have thus proved Theorem 1 for  6 p. Let us begin the
optimisation again, but now assuming p < . For any feasible
prior F ∈ D, the objective function Pr(X 6 p | k&n) can be
written as
L
L +
∫ 
p+ x
k(1 − x)n−kdF(x) + ∫ 1
+
xk(1 − x)n−kdF(x)
(A.5)
where L =
∫ p
pl
xk(1−x)n−kdF(x). As before, the mean-value-
theorem ensures the existence of three points x1, x2, x3 in the
ranges: x1 ∈ [pl, p], x2 ∈ (p, ], x3 ∈ (, 1] such that (A.5)
becomes (denote
∫ p
pl
dF(x) = γ, where 0 6 γ 6 θ):
L′
L′ + xk2(1 − x2)n−k(θ − γ) + xk3(1 − x3)n−k(1 − θ)
(A.6)
where L′ = xk1(1 − x1)n−kγ.
The derivative of (A.6) with respect to γ is always positive,
irrespective of the fixed values the xis can take in their allowed
ranges. So, to minimise (A.6), we simply set γ = 0. Thus, (A.6)
has a lower bound of 0 when p < , and the corresponding prior
distribution that attains this is still a 2-point one with probability
masses at x = x2 and x = x3, regardless of what fixed values x2
and x3 take in their allowed ranges. 
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Figure A.10: The 5 possible cases of two-point prior distributions that minimise (A.2). Notice the important role of where k/n lies.
Appendix B. Formal analysis for Q3 in Sec. 3.2
We seek to understand what happens when n1 fatality-free
driven miles support a pfm claim p with confidence c. And,
upon seeing a fatality after n1 miles, understanding how many
more fatality-free miles n2 are needed to maintain support for
the claim. So, what follows is an analysis of the asymptotic
“large n” behaviour implied by the worst-case posterior con-
fidence (3) in Theorem 1. Assume c and θ are given in the
practical case when c > θ.
Let n∗ denote the number of miles that satisfies (1−)n∗−1 =
pl(1 − pl)n∗−1. So, from Appendix A above, for n < n∗ we
have x1 = pl, and for n > n∗ we have x1 = . Note that n∗ is
independent of c and θ, so this number of miles will be the same
no matter what levels of confidence one is either interested in,
or has prior to road testing.
Now, using (3), we may write the number of miles driven
as a function of the remaining problem parameters. That is, for
 < p 6 1,
n(c, p, θ, x1, k) := k +
k log(x1/p) + log( θ(1−c)c(1−θ) )log( 1−p1−x1 )
 (B.1)
where we have assumed that the values of n ensure k/n 6 p
holds. In particular, for k = 1, let p∗ uniquely satisfy
n∗ = 1 +
 log(x1/p∗) + log( θ(1−c)c(1−θ) )log( 1−p∗1−x1 )
 (B.2)
where x1 = pl,  both result in the same n∗ value, by the defi-
nition of n∗. So, for p > p∗, we must have x1 = pl. And, for
 < p 6 p∗, we have x1 = .
If, for otherwise fixed parameter values, we denote n˜ the
number of miles according to (B.1) when k = 1, and n1 the
number of miles when k = 0, then the number of additional
miles n2 needed upon seeing a fatality immediately after n1
miles is n2 := n˜ − n1.
Suppose then, that p > p∗ and let p tend to p∗ from above.
The following limits follow from the continuity of n in (B.1):
1. If a fatality is observed (so k = 1) then, as p tends to
p∗ from above, we have x1 = pl, and the number of miles
that are needed to be driven to support a claim in p – with
confidence c using prior confidence θ in the engineering
goal  being met – is
lim
p↓p∗
n˜ = lim
p↓p∗
n(c, p, θ, pl, 1)
= n(c, lim
p↓p∗
p, θ, pl, 1) = n(c, p∗, θ, pl, 1) = n∗
2. If no fatalities are observed (so k = 0) then, as p tends
to p∗ from above, the number of fatality-free miles that
are needed to be driven to support a claim in p – with
confidence c using prior confidence θ in the engineering
goal  being met – is
lim
p↓p∗
n1 = lim
p↓p∗
n(c, p, θ, , 0) = n(c, lim
p↓p∗
p, θ, , 0)
= n(c, p∗, θ, , 0) =
log( θ(1−c)c(1−θ) )
log( 1−p
∗
1− )
Recall, from Appendix A, that x1 =  must hold here for
all p when k = 0.
3. so, using these last two results, the number of extra miles
needed is
lim
p↓p∗
n2 = n∗ −
log( θ(1−c)c(1−θ) )
log( 1−p
∗
1− )
(B.3)
Alternatively, suppose p < p∗ and let p tend to  from
above. The following limits also follow from (B.1):
1. If a fatality is observed (so k = 1), then as p tends to
 from above, we have x1 = , and the number of miles
that are needed to be driven to support a claim in p – with
confidence c using prior confidence θ in the engineering
goal  being met – is
lim
p↓
n˜ = lim
p↓
n(c, p, θ, , 1) = n(c, lim
p↓
p, θ, , 1) = ∞
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2. If no fatalities are observed (so k = 0) then, as p tends
to  from above, the number of fatality-free miles that
are needed to be driven to support a claim in p – with
confidence c using prior confidence θ in the engineering
goal  being met – is
lim
p↓
n1 = lim
p↓
n(c, p, θ, , 0) = n(c, lim
p↓
p, θ, , 0) = ∞
3. the last two results show that both n˜ and n1 grow with-
out bound, however the number of extra miles needed is
bounded above, since (by L’Hospital’s rule)
lim
p↓
n2 = lim
p↓
(n˜ − n1)
= lim
p↓
(n(c, p, θ, , 1) − n(c, p, θ, , 0))
= 1 + lim
p↓
 log(/p)
log( 1−p1− )

= 1 + lim
p↓
(1/p)
1/(1 − p) = 1 +
1 − 

= 1/ (B.4)
Note that, like n∗, this limit is independent of c and θ.
Appendix C. Statement and proof of CBI Theorem 2
Problem:
minimise
D
Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB)
subject to Pr(X 6 ) = θ, Pr(X > pl) = 1
Pr(Y 6 X) = φ, Pr(Y > pl) = 1
Solution: There is a three-point prior in D that gives the infi-
mum for the posterior confidence. When φ > 1 − θ, as shown
in Fig. 6, it is Pr(X = x,Y = y) = (1 − φ)1x=pl,y=pB + (1 −
θ)1x=pB,y=pB + (φ − 1 + θ)1x=,y= . Using this prior, the infimum
for the posterior confidence is
(1 − )nA+nBM5
(1−)nA+nBM5+(1−pB)nA+nBM3+(1−pl)nA (1−pB)nBM1 1φ>1−θ
(C.1)
where M1 = 1 − φ, M3 = 1 − θ and M5 = φ − 1 + θ, and again
1S is an indicator function – it is equal to 1 when S is true and
0 otherwise. When φ 6 1 − θ, the worst-case prior distribution
will always yield 0 as the infimum for Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB).
Thus, this case is not of practical interest.
Proof. The proof proceeds in 3 stages:
1. First we show that, for any given feasible prior distribu-
tion inD, there is an equivalent feasible 7-point prior dis-
tribution – one point for each of the 7 regions in Fig. 5.
“Equivalent”, in that the 7-point distribution yields the
same value for the posterior confidence in pfmB 6 pB as
the given feasible prior. Consequently, we restrict the op-
timisation to the setD∗ of all such 7-point distributions;
2. InD∗, for all priors with the same probability mass within
each region, we show there is an optimal point within
each region that further minimises the objective function.
Consequently, we collect all such 7-point priors, with
probability masses allocated to these optimal points, as
a new setD∗∗;
3. A monotonicity argument determines a 3-point prior (since
the other 4 points have 0 probability) inD∗∗ that gives the
infimum for the posterior confidence in pfmB 6 pB.
Stage 1: For any prior distribution FAB(x, y) ∈ D, by parti-
tioning the sample space into 7 regions as shown in Fig. 5, our
objective function of Eq. (4) can be rewritten as:
Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB) (C.2)
=
∑i=7
i=4
∫∫
regioni
(1 − x)nA (1 − y)nBdFAB(x, y)∑i=7
i=1
∫∫
regioni
(1 − x)nA (1 − y)nBdFAB(x, y)
The mean-value-theorem for integrals ensures that, within each
regioni, there exits a point (xi, yi) such that:∫ ∫
regioni
(1 − x)nA (1 − y)nBdFAB(x, y) = (1 − xi)nA (1 − yi)nBMi
(C.3)
Note, Mi is the probability mass associated with regioni, and the
ranges of xi and yi are within the regioni. So, the result (C.2)
becomes:
Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB) =
∑i=7
i=4(1 − xi)nA (1 − yi)nBMi∑i=7
i=1(1 − xi)nA (1 − yi)nBMi
(C.4)
By establishing (C.4), we have established that, for any given
prior distribution one might start off with, there exists an equiv-
alent 7-point prior distribution – one point for each regioni and
with probability mass Mi. Thus, we restrict the optimisation to
D∗, the set of all of these equivalent priors.
Stage 2: Slightly rearranging (C.4), we obtain:
Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB) = 1
1 +
∑i=3
i=1(1−xi)nA (1−yi)nBMi∑i=7
i=4(1−xi)nA (1−yi)nBMi
(C.5)
Now, for each prior inD∗, by fixing the Mis (and assuming
they satisfy the constraints), we can “move” each point (xi, yi)
freely within each regioni to further minimise (C.5).
Since all Mi > 0, to minimise (C.5), we need to min-
imise the xis and yis within region1, region2 and region3, and
to maximise the xis and yis within region4, region5, region6 and
region7. Note, this observation doesn’t depend on the values of
the Mis in their range of [0, 1]. The movement and optimal lo-
cations of point masses in each region are depicted in Fig. C.11,
that is:
(x1, y1)→ (pl, pB), (x2, y2)→ (, pB), (x3, y3)→ (pB, pB)
(x4, y4)→ (, pB), (x5, y5)→ (, ), (x6, y6)→ (pB, pB)
(x7, y7)→ (1, pB)
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So, we rewrite the objective function as (note: the term as-
sociated with M7 is 0, and thus omitted)
Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB)
> 1
1 + (1−pl)
nA (1−pB)nBM1+(1−)nA (1−pB)nBM2+(1−pB)nA (1−pB)nBM3
(1−)nA (1−pB)nBM4+(1−)nA (1−)nBM5+(1−pB)nA (1−pB)nBM6
(C.6)
Figure C.11: The movement and optimal locations of the point masses
in each region, e.g., in region5, the optimal point is at (, ).
Stage 3: Now the problem is reduced to an optimisation
problem6 with an objective function that is the r.h.s. of Eq. (C.6),
over the parametric space of the Mis and subject to the con-
straints: ∑
i=1,4,5
Mi = θ,
∑
i=3,5,7
Mi = φ,
i=7∑
i=1
Mi = 1 (C.7)
First, we rearrange the three constraints in (C.7) and sub-
stitute them into the r.h.s. of Eq. (C.6). The objective function
becomes a function h of M3, M4, M5 and M6:
h(M3,M4,M5,M6) :=
1
1 + Nu(M3,M4,M5,M6)De(M3,M4,M5,M6)
(C.8)
where
Nu(M3,M4,M5,M6) = (1 − pl)nA (1 − pB)nB(θ − M4 − M5)
+ (1 − )nA (1 − pB)nB(1 − θ − φ + M5 − M6) + (1 − pB)nA+nBM3
(C.9)
De(M3,M4,M5,M6) = (1 − )nA+nBM5 + (1 − pB)nA+nBM6
+ (1 − )nA (1 − pB)nBM4 (C.10)
Since we have considered all of the constraints, we may
treat M3, M4, M5 and M6 as independent variables. The partial
derivative of h in terms of M5 is
∂h
∂M5
=
− ∂Nu
∂M5
De + Nu ∂De
∂M5
(De + Nu)2
(C.11)
6To be exact, it is a linear-fractional programming problem (that may be
converted to an equivalent linear programming problem).
Since, upon taking partial derivatives,
∂Nu
∂M5
= −(1 − pB)nB ((1 − pl)nA − (1 − )nA ) (C.12)
∂De
∂M5
= (1 − )nA+nB (C.13)
and both Nu and De are positive, we have ∂h
∂M5
> 0; this means
h is an increasing function of M5.
Similarly, we can prove that h is an increasing function of
M4 and M6, and a decreasing function of M3. We omit the
proofs for brevity.
Now, depending on the values of θ and φ, we have two
cases:
• when φ 6 1− θ, to minimise the objective function h, we
set M5 = M4 = M6 = M7 = 0, M3 = φ, M1 = θ and
M2 = 1 − θ − φ. In this case, the worst-case prior gives
0 for the posterior confidence in the bound pfmB < pB,
and thus 0 as the infimum for (4). Consequently, we only
(non-trivially) consider the next case.
• when φ > 1 − θ, to minimise the objective function h,
we set M5 = φ − 1 + θ, M1 = 1 − φ, M3 = 1 − θ
and M2 = M4 = M6 = M7 = 0. That corresponds to
the worst-case 3-point prior depicted in Fig. 6, which is
Pr(X = x,Y = y) = (1 − φ)1x=pl,y=pB + (1 − θ)1x=pB,y=pB +
(φ− 1+ θ)1x=,y= . Using this prior distribution, the value
of Pr(Y < pB | nA, nB) is given by (6). All of the preced-
ing arguments guarantee that this value must be the infi-
mum for the posterior confidence Pr(Y 6 pB | nA, nB), as
claimed in Theorem 2.

Moreover, to properly answer questions Q4 and Q5, we
need to assign a required level of confidence c to (6), and then
solve it for nB:
nB =
ln
(
((1−θ)(1−pB)nA+(1−pl)nA (1−φ))c
(φ−1+θ)(1−c)
)
− ln (1 − )nA
ln (1 − ) − ln (1 − pB) (C.14)
The result (C.14) is also used to generate Fig. 7 by fixing c,
pB, pl, , φ, θ and treating nA as an independent variable. By
a monotonicity analyses – taking partial derivatives ∂nB(nA)
∂nA
and
solving for nA – we find that the minimum point on the curves
in Fig. 7 is located at
nA =
ln
(
− 1−θ1−φ ln
(
1−pB
1−
) (
ln
(
1−pl
1−
))−1)
ln (1 − pl) − ln (1 − pB) (C.15)
Appendix D. nB is unbounded as nA grows
Recall that pl <  < pB. Upon rewriting (C.14), we have
nB =
ln
(
1−pl
1−
)nA
+ ln

(
(1−θ)
(
1−pB
1−pl
)nA
+(1−φ)
)
c
(φ−1+θ)(1−c)

ln (1 − ) − ln (1 − pB) (D.1)
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The inequalities above imply both
(
1−pl
1−
)
> 1 and
(
1−pB
1−pl
)
< 1.
Therefore, nB → ∞ as nA → ∞, and the growth of nB is O(nA).
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